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The Economic Loss Rule: Is a Building a 
“Product?” — Another View 
STEVE SIEGFRIED,*  ERVIN GONZALEZ,**  
H. HUGH (TERRY) MCCONNELL,*** 
ALLEN BONNER,**** AND JAMES CZODLI***** 
This Article addresses how the Florida Supreme Court 
in Tiara Condominium Association v. Marsh & McLennan 
Cos. receded from its definition of “other property” in Casa 
Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & 
Sons, Inc. In Casa Clara the Florida Supreme Court held 
that a building is to be treated as a “product” for purposes 
of applying the Economic Loss Rule’s bar to tort claims for 
defective building materials incorporated into the building. 
Although Casa Clara adopted the economic loss rule estab-
lished by Seely v. White Motor Co. and East River Steamship 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., it departed from those 
seminal cases by adopting the “object of the bargain” ra-
tionale and, in doing so, determining that real property is 
the “product itself.” In addition, Casa Clara departed from 
prior Florida precedent which held that real property is not 
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a product in the context of products liability actions. More-
over, in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co. the 
United States Supreme Court rejected the “object of the bar-
gain” analysis that served as the sole basis for the Florida 
Supreme Court’s characterization of real property as the 
“the product itself.” The Saratoga Court recognized that the 
focus should be on the product that was “placed in the 
stream of commerce” instead.  Thus, when the Florida Su-
preme Court returned the economic loss rule to its original 
interpretation under Seely and East River in Tiara, it re-
ceded from Casa Clara’s holding that a building must be 
treated as a “product” for the purposes of applying the eco-
nomic loss rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Correcting a series of decisions that had expanded the Economic 
Loss Rule (“ELR”) beyond its logical application, the Florida Su-
preme Court, in Tiara Condominium Association v. Marsh & 
McLennan Cos. (“Tiara”), recently returned the ELR to its roots by 
limiting it to product liability claims where there is no personal in-
jury or damage to other property.1 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
clarified the law governing the ELR in three significant ways. First, 
the court receded from its prior holding in Casa Clara Condominium 
Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. (“Casa Clara”), 
which stated that a building must be treated as a “product” for pur-
poses of applying the ELR to bar tort claims for defective building 
                                                                                                             
 1 Tiara Condo. Ass’n Inc., v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 400 
(Fla. 2013). 
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materials.2   Second, the court expressly limited the ELR’s applica-
tion to products liability cases,3 a dramatic shift from earlier juris-
prudence that had begun applying the ELR far afield from its origi-
nal scope.4  Lastly, the Supreme did away with the so called “con-
tractual privity” ELR 
This Article focuses upon the Supreme Court’s criticism of these 
earlier cases, including Casa Clara, and maintains that Tiara re-
quires that a building must not be viewed as a single product for 
purposes of applying the ELR. Accordingly, under Tiara, the ELR 
no longer bars claims against builders and general contractors based 
upon negligent use of building materials, nor claims against manu-
facturers of defective materials where those materials cause damage 
to other materials used in a building’s construction, as Casa Clara 
previously held. 
I. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE EXPLAINED 
Under Florida law, the ELR provides as follows: 
The “economic loss” rule is a court-created doctrine 
which prohibits the extension of tort recovery for 
cases in which a product has damaged only itself and 
there is no personal injury or damage to “other prop-
erty,” and the losses or damage are economic in na-
ture. 5 
In other words, the ELR prevents recovery in tort based solely 
on a party’s economic losses.6 Application of the rule prohibits tort 
recovery for disappointed expectations, such as lost profits, delay 
damages, loss of the benefit of the bargain, and the reduced value of 
                                                                                                             
 2 Id. at 407 (“We thus recede from our prior rulings to the extent that they 
have applied the economic loss rule to cases other than products liability.”); see 
also Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n, Inc., v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 
1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993). 
 3 Tiara, 110 So. 3d at 400. 
 4 See id. at 403 n. 3 (specifying prior cases where the ELR was liberally 
applied); see also id. at 406–07 (discussing the unprincipled extension of the eco-
nomic loss rule). 
 5 Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 979 (Fla. 1999) (quoting South-
land Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 6 See id. at 980. 
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property.7 Litigants seeking compensation for these types of losses 
may find recourse in contract law, but the ELR has generally pre-
cluded their recovery in products liability and non-intentional tort 
cases.8 
Florida’s ELR first arose exclusively in the products liability 
context.9 The first expression of the ELR by the Florida Supreme 
Court precluding a tort recovery occurred in Florida Power & Light 
Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, “where steam generators 
were themselves defective but otherwise caused physical damage to 
no other property or equipment.”10 The court said that tort law “is 
particularly unsuited to cover instances where a product injures only 
itself.”11 Instead, where a product has caused damage only to itself 
and not to other property, the court concluded that recovery was un-
available in tort and restricted recovery to such remedies as re-
mained available in contract.12 
Florida Power & Light concerned a commercially produced and 
purchased product, a steam generator, which could be bought and 
sold in the normal stream of commerce.13 In this context, the ELR 
did not deprive consumers of a remedy for defective products—it 
simply placed the onus upon the parties to negotiate that remedy in 
their purchase agreement.14 The court’s rationale for doing this was 
simple: in the context of a purely economic risk that the consumer 
                                                                                                             
 7 Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Florida’s ELR, first adopted in Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 901–02 (Fla. 1987), drew on two non-Florida deci-
sions: E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) and 
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). See Fla. Power & Light, 510 
So. 2d at 900–01. The heart of the doctrine was articulated in East River: “a man-
ufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or 
strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.” E. River, 
476 U.S. at 871. See also H. Hugh McConnell, The Other Property Problem—
Applying the Economic Loss Rule to Construction Contracting Claims, 74 FLA. 
B.J. 87, 87 (2000), https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Au-
thor/8222165FB95E3EA885256ADB005D630E. 
 10 McConnell, supra note 9, at 87; see also Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d 
at 900. 
 11 McConnell, supra note 9, at 87; see also Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d 
at 901. 
 12 See Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902. 
 13 Id. at 900. 
 14 Id. at 902. 
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alone would suffer by purchasing a defective product, a consumer 
may choose to shoulder the risk if doing so means he may secure a 
better purchase price; or he may choose to impose that risk upon the 
manufacturer by paying for a warranty.15 Either way, the issue of 
where the risk of purely economic harm should lie is for the con-
tracting parties to decide in their negotiations.16 The law need not 
intervene.17 
By comparison, where a defective product placed in the stream 
of commerce injures a person or other property, the public’s safety 
is directly at risk.18 In such circumstances, the law of strict products 
liability or tort imposes duties upon the manufacturer to mitigate 
those risks, as contract law is inadequate to protect the public’s in-
terest—a notion which the ELR under Florida Power & Light left 
undisturbed.19 
II. CASA CLARA’S UNMOORED EXPANSION OF THE ELR 
Casa Clara represented a departure from Florida Power & 
Light. In Casa Clara, homeowners sought tort recovery against a 
concrete supplier whose defective concrete had damaged other com-
ponents of their buildings and undermined the structural integrity of 
the buildings as a whole.20 Unlike a steam generator, building prod-
ucts are typically “furnished by different manufacturers and suppli-
ers and are often incorporated into real property by various contrac-
tors specializing in different trades.”21 Nevertheless, the Florida Su-
preme Court did not recognize a distinction between a machine and 
its parts on one hand, and a building and its constituent materials on 
the other, concluding that the ELR applied to the homeowners’ 
claims: 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. at 901. 
 16 See id. at 902. 
 17 See id. (“We conclude that we should refrain from injecting the judiciary 
into this type of economic decision-making.”). 
 18 See East River, 476 U.S. at 866–67 (“The manufacturer is liable whether 
or not it is negligent because ‘public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in 
defective products that reach the market.’ (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944))). 
 19 See generally id.; see also Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901–02. 
 20 McConnell, supra note 9, at 87. 
 21 Id. 
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The homeowners also argue that Toppino’s concrete 
damaged “other” property because the individual 
components and items of building material, not the 
homes themselves, are the products they purchased. 
We disagree. The character of a loss determines the 
appropriate remedies, and, to determine the character 
of a loss, one must look to the product purchased by 
the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant. 
King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F. 2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Generally, house buyers have little or no interest in 
how or where the individual components of a house 
are obtained. They are content to let the builder pro-
duce the finished product, i.e., a house. These home-
owners bought finished products—dwellings—not 
the individual components of those dwellings. They 
bargained for the finished products, not their various 
components. The concrete became an integral part of 
the finished product and, thus, did not injure “other” 
property.22 
Casa Clara adopted two questionable propositions. First, the 
Florida Supreme Court focused on what the consumer purchased—
the “object” of the bargain—rather than on what the manufacturer 
or distributor released into the stream of commerce, to reach its de-
termination that the home was the product itself rather than “other 
property.”23 Second, the Florida Supreme Court broke with prior 
precedent when it characterized real property as a “product,” even 
though Florida courts have consistently held that real property is not 
a “product” in the context of products liability actions.24 
With regard to the first error, Casa Clara cited King v. Hilton-
Davis, a United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals case applying 
                                                                                                             
 22 Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247. 
 23 Id. at 1246–47 (stating that “[t]he character of a loss determines the appro-
priate remedies, and, to determine the character of a loss, one must look at the 
product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 24 Cf. Pamperin v. Interlake Cos., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (identifying a line of cases holding that structural improvements to 
real property are not generally considered products for purposes of products lia-
bility actions). See also McConnell, supra note 9, at 87. 
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Pennsylvania law,25 as the grounds for its rationale that a product 
should be defined based upon analyzing “the product purchased by 
the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant.”26 But, even as 
an out-of-state authority, King was feeble support for Casa Clara’s 
holding. As the United States Supreme Court demonstrated four 
years after Casa Clara in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & 
Co.,27 King incorrectly construed the precedent upon which it relied, 
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,28 by fo-
cusing upon the consumer’s “bargained-for expectations,” or the 
“object-of-the-bargain,”29 to determine whether the damage at issue 
was to the “product itself” or damage to “other property.”30 As the 
Supreme Court discussed, the “object-of-the-bargain” rule “pushes 
East River’s principle beyond the boundary set by the [ELR’s] ra-
tionale” and “creates a tort damage immunity beyond that set by any 
relevant tort precedent that [the Court has] found.”31 The Court con-
cluded instead that “[w]hen a manufacturer places an item in the 
stream of commerce by selling it to an Initial User, that item is the 
‘product itself’ under East River.”32 
Although Casa Clara was decided without the benefit of Sara-
toga Fishing, it is clear that Casa Clara adopted the same misinter-
pretation of East River—an “object-of-the-bargain” analysis—that 
                                                                                                             
 25 King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F. 2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 26 See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247; see also King, 855 F. 2d at 1051 (“[I]t 
is the character of the plaintiff’s loss that determines the nature of the available 
remedies.”). 
 27 520 U.S. 875, 880 (1997) (finding fault in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
that East River required it to look at what the plaintiff had purchased to define the 
defective “product itself.”). 
 28 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986). 
 29 See Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia 
coined the ‘“object-of-the- bargain’ rule” to also encompass the analysis applied 
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in King and the Florida Supreme Court in 
Casa Clara. 
 30 King, 855 F.2d at 1051 (“As we read East River, it is the character of the 
plaintiff’s loss that determines the nature of the available remedies.”). The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the consumers’ “bargained-for expectations” 
to determine whether the damage at issue was to the “product itself” or to “other 
property.” Id. at 1052 (“Focusing on the [plaintiffs’] bargained-for expectations, 
we hold that the relevant product in this case ‘injured only itself.’”). 
 31 Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 880. 
 32 Id. at 879. 
1072 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1065 
 
the United States Supreme Court expressly repudiated.33 Accord-
ingly, even before Tiara was decided, Casa Clara’s continuing via-
bility was doubtful.34 Indeed, prior to Tiara, the Florida Supreme 
Court expressly recognized the disparity between its interpretation 
of East River in Casa Clara and the United States Supreme Court’s 
clarification in Saratoga Fishing, and nonetheless cited Saratoga 
Fishing favorably.35 In Comptech International Inc. v. Milam Com-
merce Park, Ltd., the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the ELR did 
not bar a claim for damage to computers stored in a warehouse 
whose construction did not meet the Florida Building Code, a vio-
lation that is actionable under Florida statutory law. 36 Comptech 
stated that its holding was “supported by the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Saratoga Fishing. . . .”37 The Florida Su-
preme Court’s rejection of the Third District Court of Appeal’s ap-
plication of the “object- of-the-bargain rule” and its endorsement of 
                                                                                                             
 33 Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247 (“[T]o determine the character of a loss, 
one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff. . . .”). In fact, when the 
Saratoga Fishing Court provided examples of distinctions between the “product 
itself” purchased by the initial user, and “other property” incorporated with the 
product itself, it included the example of “[a] warehouse owner recover[ing] for 
damage to a building caused by a defective roof.” Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. 880 
(describing United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Indus. of Ill., Inc., 499 N.E. 2d 558, 559 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). In United Air Lines, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that 
the collapse of a defective roof, which damaged the walls and furnishings of a 
warehouse, “resulted in damage to property other than the roof” for the purposes 
of the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 563. 
 34 For example, Casa Clara specifically cites to Seely, a California Supreme 
Court case, as “set[ting] out the economic loss rule.” 620 So. 2d at 1246. However, 
California courts interpreting Seely have consistently held that the economic loss 
rule does not apply to real property. See, e.g., Stearman v. Centex Homes, 92 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 761, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that where a defectively con-
structed foundation resulted in slab movement and cracks all over the residence 
there was damage to “other property” and the ELR did not apply). See also Sara-
toga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 889–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia explicitly 
cites to Casa Clara as a case that has applied the “object-of-the-bargain rule,” 
which conflicts with the Court’s holding in Saratoga Fishing). 
 35 See Comptech Int’l, Inc., v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219, 
1226 (Fla. 1999). 
 36 See id. at 1221. 
 37 Id. at 1226. 
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Saratoga Fishing cast Casa Clara’s holding  into doubt,38 and im-
plicitly acknowledged Saratoga Fishing as the appropriate standard 
for defining “other property” for purposes of the ELR.39 
The second dubious proposition underlying Casa Clara, the 
characterization of a building as a “product,” ran counter to the well-
established rule of law in Florida that real property and structural 
improvements to real property are not “products” for purposes of 
products liability claims.40 Thus, applying the ELR to claims such 
as those litigated in Casa Clara insulated real estate builders and 
general contractors against claims from the public to an even greater 
extent than product manufacturers, as builders and general contrac-
tors were not susceptible to claims for strict products liability.41 
There was no principled policy reason given in Casa Clara for giv-
ing builders and contractors legal immunity that surpassed those 
granted to actors in virtually all other comparable professions. 
III. THE ELR’S RETURN TO ITS PRINCIPLED ROOTS 
At the greatest extent of its judicial expansion, the ELR was held 
by Florida courts to bar tort claims for economic damages arising 
from a wide variety of commercial relationships, including defective 
                                                                                                             
 38 The Court stated that “[e]ven under a Casa Clara analysis, the computers 
are ‘other property’ and not subject to the economic loss rule.” Id. If the Florida 
Supreme Court had intended Casa Clara to be controlling precedent, the Court 
would not have used the words “[e]ven under a Casa Clara analysis.” See id.; see 
also In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 794 (E.D. La. 2010) (noting that the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Moransais and Comptech “cast doubt on its decision in Casa Clara”). 
 39 See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1226. 
 40 See Pamperin v. Interlake Cos., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994), which listed cases holding that structural improvements to real prop-
erty are not generally considered products for purposes of products liability ac-
tions. Pamperin references, among others, Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So. 2d 260, 
261 (Fla. 1988) (where the Florida Supreme Court was “unwilling to hold that a 
jail facility is a product that invokes the principles of products liability cases”). 
See also Simmons v. Rave Motion Pictures Pensacola, LLC, 197 So. 3d 644, 648 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a “movie theater seating system [is] a 
structural improvement to real property and, thus, not a product.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Plaza v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 971 So. 2d 918, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) (holding that a general contractor could not be held liable under a 
theory of strict products liability because “as a matter of law, the subject conveyor 
is a structural improvement to real property, not a product.”). 
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products,42 faulty business services,43 negligent construction con-
tracting,44 and professional malpractice.45 
That development of the ELR, and the confusion conveyed by 
its rapidly changing scope, led the Florida Supreme Court to express 
concern “with what it perceived as an over-expansion of the eco-
nomic loss rule.”46 Beginning with Moransais v. Heathman,47 con-
tinuing with Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American 
Aviation, Inc.,48 and finally in Tiara, 49 the Florida Supreme Court 
has steadily reversed this course by limiting application of the ELR 
to its principled beginnings. 
First, in Moransais, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the 
ELR does not apply to professional negligence claims.50 In doing so, 
                                                                                                             
 42 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900 
(Fla. 1987) (power generating equipment). 
 43 AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180–82 (Fla. 1987) 
(inaccurate telephone listing). 
 44 Sandarac Ass’n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1350–
51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 45 Id. (architectural design). But see Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson 
Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994) (declining to apply the ELR to 
professional malpractice). 
 46 Tiara Condo. Ass’n Inc., v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 406 
(Fla. 2013). 
 47 Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999). In Moransais the 
Florida Supreme Court states that its holdings after Florida Power & Light “have 
appeared to expand the application of the [ELR] beyond its principled origins and 
have contributed to applications of the rule by trial and appellate courts to situa-
tions well beyond our original intent.” Id. at 980. The Florida Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to criticize Casa Clara as one such expansive holding: 
We also stated expansively in Casa Clara that “[w]hen only economic harm is 
involved, the question becomes ‘whether the consuming public as a whole should 
bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for ad-
equate contract remedies.’ In Airport Rent–A–Car, we followed the reasoning in 
Casa Clara in holding the economic loss rule barred a cause of action for negli-
gence against the manufacturer of defective buses where the only damage alleged 
was to the buses themselves. 
Id. at 981 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 48 Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 
2004). 
 49 Tiara, 110 So. 3d at 407 (“Having reviewed the origin and original purpose 
of the economic loss rule, and what has been described as the unprincipled exten-
sion of the rule, we now take this final step and hold that the economic loss rule 
applies only in the products liability context.”). 
 50 Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 983. 
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the court expressly rejected an argument that such claims were anal-
ogous to the claims brought in Casa Clara: “[Casa Clara] was not 
unanimous,” the court remarked, “especially as to our characteriza-
tion of ‘other property.’”51 Although the opinion failed to describe 
what differences of opinion the members of the court had, in his 
dissent Senior Justice Overton notably complained that the majority 
“effectively overruled our rather recent decision in Casa Clara with-
out saying so.”52 
Next, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in American Aviation that 
the ELR was limited to two circumstances: (1) cases involving con-
tractual privity between the parties (the “contractual privity” ELR); 
and (2) cases where products damage themselves (the “product lia-
bility” ELR).53  It stated plainly: 
We conclude that the “economic loss doctrine” or 
“economic loss rule” bars a negligence action to re-
cover solely economic damages only in circum-
stances where the parties are either in contractual 
privity or the defendant is a manufacturer or distrib-
utor of a product, and no established exception to the 
application of the rule applies.54 
With regard to claims in the latter category, the Supreme Court 
was specific in limiting the ELR to claims against only manufactur-
ers and distributors of products (as opposed to “builders,” for exam-
ple), and only where the product damages itself: “we hold that a 
manufacturer or distributor in a commercial relationship has no duty 
beyond that arising from its contract to prevent a product from mal-
functioning or damaging itself.”55 As Justice Cantero explained in 
his concurrence, “the economic loss rule does not apply in the ser-
vices context unless a contract exists.”56 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. at 981. 
 52 Id. at 985 (Overton, J., dissenting). 
 53 American Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 534. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 542–43. 
 56 Id. at 544 (Cantero, J., concurring). 
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The ELR was further simplified in Tiara, where the Florida Su-
preme Court discarded the “contractual privity” prong of the ELR57 
and limited the ELR’s application to products liability cases:58 
“[W]e expressly limited tort liability with respect to defective prod-
ucts to injury caused to persons or damage caused to property other 
than the defective product itself.”59 
IV. TIARA’S IMPACT ON CASA CLARA 
When read alongside one another, American Aviation and Tiara 
demonstrate that the product liability ELR, as now defined by the 
Florida Supreme Court, is strictly limited to circumstances where 
“the defendant is a manufacturer or distributor of a product”60 and 
the defective product injures only itself.61  The ELR therefore has 
only limited application in the context of building construction, 
where Florida recognizes a clear distinction between contractors, 
who furnish services, 62 and manufacturers and distributors, who fur-
nish products, in connection with improving real property.63 
First, because the ELR can apply only to products sold by man-
ufacturers and distributors, logically it cannot apply to products that 
are not sold by manufacturers and distributors. Since manufacturers 
and distributors create and sell building materials, as opposed to im-
proving real estate, the ELR can apply only to building materials, 
not real estate. Moreover, the ELR can apply only to claims brought 
                                                                                                             
 57 Compare id. at 536–37 (explaining the contractual privity economic loss 
rule), with Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 
(Fla. 2013) (limiting the economic loss rule to products liability cases). 
 58 Tiara, 110 So. 3d at 407. A residue of the contractual privity ELR, formally 
eliminated in Tiara, remains in Justice Pariente’s concurring opinion, in which 
she recognized that “to bring a valid tort claim, a party still must demonstrate that 
all of the required elements for the cause of action are satisfied, including that the 
tort is independent of any breach of contract claim.” Id. at 408 (Pariente, J., con-
curring). 
 59 Id. at 405 (quoting American Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 541). 
 60 American Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 534. 
 61 Tiara, 110 So. 3d at 405. 
 62 See Jackson v. L.A.W. Contracting Corp., 481 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986) (stating that contractor in that case was a provider of services and 
not goods). 
 63 See id. (distinguishing case in which contractor applied road sealant from 
one in which contractor applied and manufactured road sealant). 
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with respect to a defective product that damages only “itself.”64 This 
excludes other materials that compose a structural improvement. 
Thus, where defective building materials damage materials that 
come from different suppliers, the ELR does not apply—these man-
ufacturers did not supply “a building” as their product, only constit-
uent parts.65 With respect to the “other property” analysis, this artic-
ulation of the ELR puts the focus back on manufacturers and dis-
tributors and the products they put into the stream of commerce—
and the public benefit brought about by imposing strict liability upon 
them—rather than focusing on the finished product that a consumer 
buys. 
Second, a contractor provides the service of directing the manner 
and means in which building materials are installed in order to ac-
complish the intended design of a structure. By contrast, material 
suppliers are in the business of manufacturing or distributing prod-
ucts and are deemed to be merchants who give warranties pursuant 
to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).66  The use of building ma-
terials in the ordinary course of providing general contracting ser-
vices does not transform a contractor into a distributor.67 Accord-
ingly, the ELR does not stand as a bar to tort claims against contrac-
tors, subcontractors, design professionals and other actors who pro-
vide services toward the construction of a building. 
                                                                                                             
 64 See Tiara, 110 So. 2d at 405. 
 65 Cf. Adobe Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., v. Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033, 1033, 1035 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review dismissed, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1981) (holding that 
retailer or wholesaler is subject to tort liability when purchaser combines product 
with another product or substance and suffers economic damages from use of the 
final amalgam). Adobe was expressly disapproved by the Florida Supreme Court. 
See Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 
1248 (Fla. 1993). 
 66 Construction Law Survival Manual: Ch 4 - Uniform Commercial Code 
Sale Of Goods, FULLERTON & KNOWLES, http://www.fullertonlaw.com/uniform-
commercial-code#g (“Most construction material buyers and sellers will be mer-
chants for transactions in the ordinary course of their business.”) (last visited Apr. 
2017). 
 67 See, e.g., Jackson, 481 So. at 1292 (road contractor not liable in warranty 
as a distributor for defective sealant applied to road surface); Arvida Corp. v. A.J. 
Indus., Inc., 370 So. 2d 809, 810, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam) 
(contractor not liable under UCC for parts and materials used in repairing bath-
room fixtures). 
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That leaves tort claims against manufacturers and distributors of 
products as the sole survivor of the ELR’s decline, effectively reset-
ting the clock back to 1987 and the Florida Supreme Court’s first 
adoption of the ELR in Florida Power & Light.68 At that time, strict 
liability in tort had been adopted in Florida,69 and at least one district 
had expressly recognized an action for strict liability against the dis-
tributor of a defective building material for damage done to the 
building in which it was incorporated.70 
If, as stated in Tiara, the applicability of ELR rule in Florida has 
returned to its original rationale and intent under Seely (1965), East 
River (1986), and Florida Power & Light (1987), 71 then the clock 
must also be reset with regards to real property’s place within the 
context of the ELR.72 Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Sara-
toga Fishing, the Florida Supreme Court’s application of the “ob-
ject-of-the-bargain” analysis in Casa Clara does not align with the 
“original rationale and intent” of East River and, therefore, was re-
ceded from in Tiara.73 That is to say: (1) for purposes of applying 
the ELR, courts must look at the product placed in the stream of 
commerce by the manufacturer or distributor, and (2) real property 
falls outside the purview of the ELR, which “applies only in the 
products liability context.”74 
                                                                                                             
 68 Fla. Power & Light v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 
1987). 
 69 West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976). 
 70 Adobe, 403 So. 2d at 1033. 
 71 See Tiara Condo. Ass’n Inc., v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 
406 (Fla. 2013) (“In American Aviation, in recognizing our history of unprinci-
pled extension of the rule, [the Florida Supreme Court] concluded that the eco-
nomic loss rule should be expressly limited to the original rationale and intent of 
Seely, East River, and Florida Power . . . .”). Notably, Casa Clara was not among 
those cases to which the Florida Supreme Court expressly cited. See id. 
 72 In Tiara, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the application of the ELR 
in Florida from its inception to its ruling in Florida Power, which would include 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Adobe, reveals a strict adherence 
to the reasoning of East River and Seely. See id. at 405. The Florida Supreme 
Court also reiterates that its rulings after Florida Power “appeared to expand the 
application of the rule beyond its principled origins” and lists Casa Clara (and its 
determination that real property is a product) as an example of its expanded ap-
plication of the rule. See id. at 405–06 & n.5. 
 73 See Tiara, 110 So. 3d at 407. 
 74 See id.; see also Pamperin v. Interlake Cos., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1137, 1140 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and cases cited therein. 
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CONCLUSION 
With its opinion in Tiara, the Florida Supreme Court has 
properly rolled back the invasive nature of the ELR as defined by 
previous jurisprudence, including Casa Clara’s incorrect definition 
of real property as a product.75 The Florida Supreme Court’s focus 
on “object-of-the-bargain” analysis in Casa Clara served as the 
foundation for its characterization of a building as “the product it-
self” for purposes of applying the ELR to claims related to the de-
fective concrete at issue in that case.  But in light of Saratoga Fish-
ing76 and the Florida Supreme Court’s rulings in Comptech,77 Ma-
ransais,78 American Aviation,79 and Tiara,80 the foundation support-
ing Casa Clara has crumbled. These latter cases confirm that the 
building-as-product doctrine must give way to viewing a building as 
its constituent parts for purposes of applying the ELR. Defective 
building materials that damage materials that come from different 
manufacturers and distributors should not be subject to the ELR, as 
these are different products causing harm to one another, and not a 
product damaging “itself.” From the outset of the ELR’s existence, 
its intended application was only in the products liability context—
a context to which it has been appropriately returned under Tiara. 
 
                                                                                                             
 75 See Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 
1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993). 
 76 Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997). 
 77 Comptech Int’l, Inc., v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 
1999). 
 78 Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999). 
 79 Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 
2004). 
 80 Tiara Condo. Ass’n Inc., v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 
2013) 
